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Abstract: This paper extends the standard analysis of optimal 
non-linear utility pricing with a single pricing schedule, to 
the operational and practical case where different schedules are 
implemented for different groups, with cross-subsidization 
across these groups. Apart from its theoretical interest, this 
joint treatment of non-linear pricing and cross-subsidization to 
achieve distributional objectives reveals features which are not 
present in the standard analysis. For example, it is found that 
under certain conditions the group which is being cross­
subsidized should have an increasing block rate (or "lifeline") 
pricing schedule, while the group which is being cross-taxed 
should have a decreasing block rate (or "quantity discount") 
schedule. This puts into sharp relief the earlier "all or 
nothing" debate in the literature between these two structures. 
Our calculations also show that the gains from using two 
schedules instead of one can be substantial. 
-
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1. Introduction 
Wi th the accelerated move towards privatization of public 
utili ties in developing countries, some old issues on public 
utility pricing and the poor have reemerged. Among the arguments 
for privatization are (a) increasing the efficiency of 
management by insulting it from political pressures on day 
operations (eg hiring and firing decisions) and (b) greater 
economic efficiency by linking pricing to costs through the 
profit motive. And yet there are sufficient concerns about the 
possible impact of untrammeled market forces in these sensitive 
sectors, particularly about the distributional impact of pricing 
decisions, that privatization under the framework of regulation 
and oversight is an attractive alternative to completely free 
markets. The sorts of regulations that might be considered are 
to do with broad guidelines on pricing structure, and on cross­
subsidization across groups. 
These concerns are not of course new. Pricing structures 
designed to reflect quantity used and hence underlying income 
or wealth of the consumer are prevalent in both developed and 
developing countries. In developed countries, there has been 
much discussion of "lifeline rates" and other devices to give 
the poor lower prices for electricity (Diamopoulos, 1981). In 
developing countries, increasing block tariffs-i. e. "a price 
structure in which a commodity is priced up to a specified 
volume of use (block), then at a higher or several increasingly 
higher rates for additional blocks used" are common for water 
tariffs (Whittington, 1992) as well as for other utilities. At 
the same time, differential price structures for rural versus 
urban areas are also found, justified on grounds of targeting 
predominantly poor populations. 
Of course, there is a large literature on the shape of 
pricing schedules of regulated utilities. A recent review and ­
exposition of non-linear pricing structures is available in 
Wilson (1993), which updates and extends the earlier synthesis 
by Brown and Sibley (1986). Earlier well known papers include 
those by Meyer(1975), Berg and Roth(1976), Roberts (1979) , 
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Diamopoulos(1981) and Maskin and Riley(1984). This entire 
literature follows a common framework where there is a 
distribution of consumers differentiated by incomes or tastes 
who make choices on consuming the utility's output, and the 
utili ty then chooses the single pricing schedule to maximi ze 
some objective function-with differing weights given to 
distributional concerns in different studies. The literature 
shows that this single pricing schedule can have a range of 
characteristics, depending on the distribution of income, 
consumer tastes, and distributional concerns. 
So much for single schedule analysis. And yet, in practice, it 
appears that there are different pricing schedules for different 
categories of consumers. And cross-subsidization across groups ­
residential versus commercial, rural versus urban, government 
versus private, etc. - has been a staple descussion item in the 
policy arena. The object of this paper is to consider the twin 
issues of pricing structure and cross-subsidization jointly, in 
a framework where the distributional concerns are made explicit. 
It will be seen that this joint analysis highlights a number of 
features and raises a number of concerns not present in the 
conventional analysis. The optimal pricing structure within a 
group will be seen to be intimately connected to the structure 
of cross subsidization across groups, and to display surprising 
features. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the 
basic theoretical model of the optimal non-linear pricing with 
two distinguishable groups, and highlights the main qualitative 
features of the optimal pricing structures. It turns out that 
qualitative analysis cannot get us very far in gaining insights 
into the features of the optimal schedules in each of the two 
groups. Section 3 moves to a discussion of numerical solutions, 
and sets out the main results of the paper. Section 4 concludes 
the paper. ­
2. The model 
The model developed here is an adaptation of the standard 
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model of non-linear pricing (see Wilson,1993). We assume that 
the consumers can be divided by the utility into two mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive groups and that consumers are unable to 
switch between these groups. The groups are indexed 1 and 2. 
These can be thought of as rural/urban, young/old, 
resident/commercial, etc .. Within groups consumers differ with 
respect to their income, denoted by real number y. This is 
distributed with continuous density function f i with fi(Y)~O, i 
=1,2, on closed interval [Yo,Yt] where Yo and Yt denote the lower 
and upper limits to the income distribution. Without loss of 
generality we assume that the mean of group l's income exceeds 
the mean of group 2's income - we refer to group 1 as the richer 
group and group 2 as the poorer or II needy group, even thoughII 
there are income overlaps as between the two groups. The 
population share of group 1 is 0, and that of group 2 1-0. 
We assume that there are two goods in the economy; a 
composite good, x, and the good, q (subject to nonlinear 
pricing) supplied by the utility. We assume that preferences 
are identical within groups but differ between them. Thus 
consumers who belong to group i, have identical concave utility 
function 
where u i E C2 , aUi / aqi > 0, aUi / aXi > a 'V qi' Xi ~ O. We wi 11 
further assume that q is a normal good. It is typical in 
nonlinear pricing literature to exclude income effects a priori. 
The usual motivation for ignoring income effects when 
constructing tariffs for services offered to household consumers 
is that their income elasticies are small and/or their residual 
income, x, is large in relation to their expenditures on the 
nonlinearly priced good or services, q. These assumptions cannot 
always justified and it will become clear that the properties of ­
an optimal pricing schedule may crucially depend on income 
effects. 
The pricing schedule is given by functions Ri (qJ. If a 
consumer wishes to-purchase an amount qi then he or she must pay 
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an amount Ri to the utility. We assume that Ri is monotone and 
differentiable. The rate of change of total payment with respect 
to a change in quantity purhased Ri ' (q) = dR i (q) /dq is called 
marginal price. 
A consumer with income y chooses q so as to maximize (1) 
subject to 
(2 ) Xi + R, (qJ = y.
 
In mathematical form this becomes the problem (P)
 
( 3 )	 max u i (Xi' qi) 
qi' Xi 
subject	 to 
The last constraint says that consumers have the option of 
leaving the market altogether and pay nothing to the public 
utility. Thus a participation constraint is required. 
We assume that the utility (or the utility regulator) applies 
separate nonlinear pricing schedules to groups 1 and 2. The 
obj ective can be described by the utilitarian social welfare 
function 
(4)	 W = Jt [E>u1f1(y) + (1-0) u 2 f 2 (y) ] dy 
Yo 
The utility determines optimal schedules Ri (qJ, i =1,2, by 
maximizing (4) subject to profit constraint 
(5 ) J't [07t1 (% (y) ) f 1 (y) + (1-0) 1t2 (% (y) ) f 2 (y) ] dy ~ 0
 
Yo
 
-

where 1t1(.) = R1 (% (y) ) -cql (y) -G, 1t2 (.) = R2 (% (y) ) -c% (y) -G , c is 
marginal cost (constant) and G is fixed cost). There is an 
additional constraint, that given the pricing schedule Ri , i = 
1,2, each consumer determines his or her consumption by solving 
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problem (P). 
Next we formulate the nonlinear pricing problem of the public 
utility or government programme as an optimal control problem 
subject to state and control constraints. Let us define the 
utili ty of an y-consumer, when qi (y) and Xi (y) are optimally 
chosen, as the maximum value function 
( 6 )	 Vi (y) = max {ui (Xi' qi) : Xi+Ri (qJ -y= 0 }
 
qi' Xi
 
By differentiating (6) with respect to y we obtain 
(7) dvi/dy = [dUi/dqJ [dqi/dy] 
+ [dUi/dRi ] [dRJdy] + dUi/dy 
Making use of the condition, implied by 
maximization 
(8) [dUi/dqi] [dqi/dy] + [dUi/dRd [dRi/dy] 
we have 
consumer's 
= 0 
utility 
This is also called a self-selection condition or incentive 
compatability condition. 
As q is a normal good it is obvious that all consumers cannot 
be at a global maximum unless the following constraint holds 
Defining the consumer's marginal rate of substitution between 
product and income 
-
where g = - UR is type y's marginal utility.of income, and 
preferences are taken to satisfy the so called Mirrlees-Spence 
restriction that 
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(12) dwJdy> O. 
This means that increasing y increases the marginal willingness 
to pay for the utility output. In fact (12) is a sufficient 
assumption to ensure that (6) is equivalent to (9) and q 
increase with income y (See Mirrlees , 1976). We assume that 
condition (12) holds so that we can substitute the individuals 
utility maximization problem by weaker condition (9). 
vi(y) is continuous and strictly increasing in Xi. Thus (7) 
can be inverted so that Xi (y) = hi (Vi (y) I qi (y) I y). Furthermore weI 
may eliminate Ri (q) by the condi tion (2). Now qi (y) and Vi (y) 
can be treated as state functions and r i (y) = dqJdy for all 
yE [Yol Yt] as a control variable. Thus we first calculate an 
optimal allocation and then subsequently derive by condition (2) 
the marginal price schedule that implements this allocation. Now 
we can formulate the nonlinear pricing problem as an optimal 
control problem as follows 
The nonlinear pricing problem (Q) 
(13 ) Max W 
subject to state equations 
(14)	 dvll dy = (dUll dy) Vye [Yol Yt] 
dv2 /dy = (dU2 /dy) Vye [Yol Yt] 
dqi I dy = r i (y) I i =1 I 2 I Vye [Yo I Yt ] 
and	 the constraints 
Yl' (15) J {0[y-hl (VII ql) -C% (y) -G] f l (y) 
Yo 
• 
Furthermore in numerical solution we use the constraints that 
% (y) ~ 0 and % (y) ~ 0 Vy e [Yo I Yd. 
It is self-evident that if VI = v 2 and f l = f 21 the optimal 
policy yields R (q) = Rl (q) = R2 (q) . Thus we only have an 
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interesting situation when either preferences or distributions 
or both are different in different groups. It is also obvious 
that in general additional instruments can only improve the 
level of social welfare, since it is always open to the utility 
to set a common schedule. 
Differentiating the Lagrangean of the problem (Q) with 
respect to qi{') and v i {.) gives the first order conditions. When 
consumers with different incomes are not bunched together these 
conditions imply a pattern of marginal prices satisfying 
(16)	 R'd%] = C-Jll{y) [gl{aW1/ay) /8Af1{y)]
 
R'2[%] = C-Jl2{y) [g2{aw2/ay)/{l-8)Af2{y)]
 
where A	 is the multiplier on the profit constraint and 
(17)	 Jll{y) = {8[(A/g1)-W'] [exp-0auy/aR1)/gdf1dm
 
Yo m
 
Jl2{y) =	 {{1-8) [(A/g2)-W'] [exp-0auy/aR2)/g2]f2dm 
Yo m 
are the multipliers on the incentive compatibility condition 
from the two groups. In (16) we have used the fact that a[Uy]/aq 
= gwy. (17) satisfies the transversality conditions 
Using (16) and (17) it can be proved that 
We can see from (16) that the optimum distortion between 
marginal price and marginal cost in different groups depends 
upon several factors, Jl, g, wy' A and f. A structure of marginal 
prices is based on three components. The first is the marginal 
-
cost. The second term arises purely from the incentive nature of 
... 
the problem. We can interpret Jl (y) as measure of the social 
value of providing a transfer to consumers with an income above 
y. A is the social value of funds to the utility. 
On the basis of equations (16) to (19) we can find some 
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general qualitative properties of schedules. It turns out that 
the qualitative properties of Ri(q) are the same as in the single 
schedule model. We have the following list of properties: 
(Pl) for all q 
(P2) Ri '= c at the upper end-point of the schedule 
(P3 ) Ri '= c at the bottom end if there is no bunching at the 
lowest income1 
(P4) Ri ' is strictly greater than c for all qi such that qdyo) 
< qi < qi (yf) • 
The above well known results provide us with benchmark for 
group specific pricing schedules but do not tell us anything in 
detail about the shapes of these schedules and how they depend 
upon parameters such as group mean incomes of group 
inequalities. In order to address the issues the literature and 
policYrnakers are grappling with, we have to move to numerical 
simulations. 
3. Numerical simulations2 
We can provide better understanding of the form of optimal 
schedules through numerical simulations. The calculations were 
carried out for the following utility functions 
(20 ) Ui(Xitqi) = (l-ui)ln(xi+E)+uiln(%+E) i=l,2
 
(20' ) udxi,qi) = -[(l-Ui)/(xi+E)]-[UJ(qi+E)] i=l,2
 
where U is the weight on q and (l-u) the weight on x. E is a 
small positive constant to assure that (20) is well defined for 
1If there is bunching, then the consumers on the lower end 
do not pay marginal prices which are equal to marginal costs. 
-

2 The nonlinear problem was solved by the FORTRAN program 
MISER3. This program has been developed to solve a general class 
of optimal control problem with constraints. The constraints are 
allowed to be of equality as well inequality type. The program 
is based on the concept of the control parametrization 
technique: to transform an optimal control problem to a 
mathematical programming problem. The detailed usage of MISER3 
is described in the User's guide (see Jennings,Fisher,Teo and 
Goh,1990). 
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all qi,xi ~ O. To focus on income distribution, we assume that 
preferences are identical across the two groups. Incomes in 
different groups are taken to be distributed according to a 
lognormal distribution (~i,cri)' The objective function of 
utility is the concave transformation of each consumer's utility 
in different groups, reflecting society's distributional 
preferences: 
( 2 3 ) W = - (1 / g) e -Sv 
where g expresses the degree of inequality aversion. The results 
are given for two different forms of the objective function: g 
= 0 (in this case we define W = v) corresponding to the 
classical utilitarian case and g = 5. The average (marginal) 
cost of production c = 1 and fixed cost is zero. 
Figure 1 presents our base run (we set E at 0.005) throughout 
the paper. The degree of inequality aversion g is set at zero 
and the expenditure share of the utility commodity, a, is set at 
10%. We consider two specifications of population shares, e = 
0.3 and e = 0.7, which capture "relatively large" and 
"relatively small" numbers of the poorer group, respectively. 
With e = 0.3, Figure 1 demonstrates a pattern of marginal 
prices which decline with income over most of the range (see 
north-east panel). Thus, optimally, we have a quantity discount 
rather than an increasing block rate structure. Moreover, notice 
that with e = 0.7 the structure in group 2, the poorer group, is 
very different. Now for most of the income range the marginal 
price increases with income (and hence quantity premium), 
although of course at the very top it falls to marginal cost as 
by the qualitative result in (P2). Thus we see both quantity 
discount (for the rich group) increasing block rates (for the 
• 
poor group) . 
Why does such a pattern occur? One clue is to be found in the 
extent of cross-subsidization. With e = 0.7 .this runs to around 
60% of the expenditure by the poorer groups on the utility's 
output. Viewing this as a single group, this is a large 
"negative profit requirement". This is analogue to the revenue 
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requirement in models of optimal income taxation, and it is 
argued in Immonen et al. (1998) that when revenue requirement is 
negative and large i.e. optimality calls for large subsidy on 
distributional grounds, the pattern of taxation will involve a 
large subsidy to the poorest in the poorer group, clawed back by 
increasing marginal tax rates in the same group. The analog in 
the case of utility pricing is an increasing marginal price 
structure over a large portion of the income range. When the 
proportion of the poorer group in the population is large, the 
subsidy per capita is smaller and hence this effect is less 
likely to arise. 
Some sense of the analytical basis of the numerical results 
can be found from (16). From it we know that the variation of 
the optimal marginal prices with level of purchases is a complex 
matter. One consideration, however, is the variation of ~i with 
y. It is straightforward to show that ~i starts and finishes with 
a value of zero (the transversality condition) and has an u­
shape in-between. Intuitively, ~i measures the social value of 
giving a direct poll subsidy to consumer with an income above y. 
At low level of income ~ tends to decrease with y and it reaches 
the minimum point at which A = W'g. When the profit requirement 
is low, so is A, the social value of funds to the utility. Then 
a reduction in the profit requirement can be expected to shift 
the point at which ~(y) has a minimum to the right. Thus 
~(y) will continue to decrease further into the distribution 
than would otherwise be the case. 
Figure 2 shows the effect of going to the CES utility 
function (20') - this is essentially the case with elasticity of 
substitution between the utility produced commodity and the 
other good set at half rather than 1. The population share of 
group 1 is set at 30% once again. It is seen that there is once 
again an increasing block rate structure in marginal prices over 
much of income range - it is not till almost 80% the population 
is crossed that the marginal price starts declining back to 
­
marginal cost, as it must. There is also an increasing marginal 
price phase in the pricing structure for the richer group, but 
this is much smaller. Figure 3 and 4 conduct sensitivity 
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exercises with respect to inequality aversion and the mean
 
differences between the groups. The results are as expected.
 
Increased inequality aversion raises the marginal price schedule
 
for the better off group and lowers it for the poorer group, as :
 
does greater inequality between the two groups.
 
Our calculations also allow us to gauge the relative gains 
from using two schedules versus being restricted to only one. 
The gain in the base case (Fig 5) with e = 0.3, is 1.5% - the 
gain of the poorer group is 5%. In the CES-case (Fig 6) with e 
= 0.3 the gain of the poorer group is 8%. Although not shown in 
the figures as e increases to 0.7, the average gain reaches 4%. 
With e = 0.7 and a = 0.3, the gain rises to 15%. 
4. Conclusions 
We have developed a model in which the utility implements 
different price schedules on different groups of the population. 
These schemes reflect both consumers special circumstances and 
incomes. The available analytical results are limited, and we 
have to employ numerical simulations. The simulations suggest 
that the gains from the appropriate use of group tariffs can be 
substantial. They also suggest unexpected pattern of marginal 
prices,including combinations where the poorer group gets 
"lifeline rates" while the richer group gets "quantity premium". 
This indicates that the "all or nothing" debate between these 
two structures may need to become much more nuanced in the 
future. 
-
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